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Abstract
In this article the author analyzes the term !power sharing" (PS) in the 
context of power exercised within a state. He Þ rst examines the term in the 
very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions 
of power sharing between various groups and institutional entities. Second, 
the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, 
the phenomenon of systemic power sharing by groups (segments) whose 
membership is based on ascribed criteria such as common ancestors, 
relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common 
language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense 
are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious 
and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, 
the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of PS 
in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power 
sharing. 
Keywords: power sharing, consociationalism, centripetalism, hybrid power sharing.
INTRODUCTION
Although the term !power sharing" (PS) is very often encountered 
in the political sciences, it has not been precisely deÞ ned and there 
is no consensus among political scientists as to its exact meaning. 
In other words, the term has not yet been fully conceptualized; it 
has not completed its passage from a notion#the stage at which 
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potential meanings are imagined and assigned!to the stage at 
which the term becomes a bona-Þ de theoretical concept, deÞ ned 
on the basis of in-depth and usually empirically based theoretical 
reß ection.
In this article I analyze the term "PS# in the context of power 
exercised within a state. I Þ rst examine the term in the broad sense, 
in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of power 
sharing between various groups and institutional entities. 
Second, I examine the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, 
that is, the phenomenon of systemic power sharing in a state 
by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed 
criteria (for example, common ancestors, living relatives, or racial 
background) and/or cultural ones (for example, a common language, 
religion, or celebrations).1 Members of such segments are conscious 
of belonging to them and of possessing traits that form the ascriptive 
or cultural bases of their identity, setting them apart from members 
of other segments. The basic segmental units in this sense are 
nations (understood in the sociological, not political, sense), ethnic 
groups, and religious and denominational communities that form 
a part of so-called divided (multi-segmental) societies, including 
deeply divided ones.2
Third, I show the differences between the principal models (types) 
of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism (also 
called integrative PS), and hybrid power sharing.3 The Þ rst two 
models are comprised of a number of characteristic institutions 
1 B. Krauz-Mozer, "To samo  ! czy to tylko suma spotka  i opowie ci?# ["Identity $ Is 
It Just the Sum of Meetings and Stories?#], Studia rodkowoeuropejskie i Ba kanistyczne, 
2017, Vol. 26, p. 14.
2 B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate%s Introduction,# 
in: Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, J. McEvoy, B. O%Leary (eds.), University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2013, pp. 5$6.
3 Brendan O%Leary and John McGarry also single out multiculturalism and territorial 
pluralism. See B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places",# pp. 19$21. The 
mainly theoretical PS models are, especially, the Lewis Model, (W. Arthur Lewis, Politics 
in West Africa, Oxford University Press, New York 1965; W. Arthur Lewis, "Beyond African 
Dictatorship: The Crisis of the One-Party State,# Encounter, August 1965, pp. 3$18; 
Y. Mine, "The Political Element in the Works of W. Arthur Lewis: The 1954 Lewis Model 
and African Development,# The Developing Economies, 2006, Vol. 44, Issue 3, pp. 329$
$355) and Complex Power Sharing (S. Wolff, Conß ict Resolution between Power Sharing and 
Power Dividing, or Beyond?# Political Studies Review, 2007, Vol. 5, pp. 363$379; S. Wolff, 
"Complex Power Sharing,# in: Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States, G.K. Brown, 
A. Langer (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2012, pp. 457$477; S. Wolff, Situating Complex 
Power Sharing in the Conß ict Settlement Literature, 2010, pp. 1$24, http://stefanwolff.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CPSbgrd.pdf [access: March 21, 2018].
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(understood as a set of principles), corresponding to the conceptual 
bases of these models. In addition to full models, in multi-segmental 
states it is possible to distinguish certain consociational or 
centripetal institutions that are not, in those states, part of a larger 
set of PS institutions typical of a given model. 
The third model I propose to call "hybrid power sharing# 
(HPS), because it combines elements that are typical of either the 
consociational or the centripetal PS models. In the HPS model, 
elements of one of the PS models in the narrow sense are dominant 
but are enhanced by certain institutions typical of the other model. 
The functioning of the HPS model has yet to be fully described in the 
literature.4
My analysis concentrates above all on the narrow sense of 
PS, which is easier to conceptualize than the broad sense as 
it is more speciÞ c. Mine is one voice in a wider discussion as 
I attempt to establish the meaning of the term "PS.# Making a clear 
differentiation between the two principal meanings of the term is 
intended to help researchers make more precise and conscious 
use of the terms. I believe such a distinction is needed to achieve 
a clearer scholarly discourse.
PS IN THE BROAD SENSE
The term "PS# in the broad sense refers to different dimensions, 
means, and entities of power sharing in a state. PS can be associated 
above all with the notion of separation of powers, a key concept in 
the political sciences. It is akin to the "tripartite system# of legislative, 
executive, and judiciary branches laid out by Montesquieu in his 
De l#esprit des lois and originating in John Locke%s ideas in Two 
Treatises on Government. In this sense, power is shared in the same 
horizontal dimension between different branches of government, 
which exercise different powers. 
4 See articles on the topic by K. Trzci ski, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia,# 
Polish Political Science Yearbook, 2017, Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp. 168$185; K. Trzci ski, "The 
Consociational Addition to Indonesia%s Centripetalism as a Tactic of the Central Authorities: 
The Case of Papua,# Hemispheres: Studies on Cultures and Societies, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 4, 
pp. 5$20; K. Trzci ski, "How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing 
Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria,# 
Politeja, 2016, No. 42, Issue 3, pp. 53$73. 
12 Krzysztof Trzci ski
In the horizontal dimension, PS can arise between various 
political parties (as part of coalition governments formed after the 
elections), but also between political parties and other entities (such 
as trade unions and various social organizations and movements), 
as well as between men and women.
Certain scholars understand the term "PS# to mean power shared 
between the parties of a conß ict, which has been settled by a peace 
accord.5 Such a situation most often entails the de facto adoption 
of the term "PS# as a means to describe power sharing within the 
framework of something that has long been known in the literature 
as a "government of national unity.# Thus in the context of peace-
building, "power sharing is used as a tool for the resolution of 
conß ict or its prevention in the future# and is deÞ ned as an "elite 
pact between representatives of political or military parties on the 
division of responsibility in different Þ elds of political and economic 
life.#6 Such a deÞ nition of PS has been used to analyze the ending 
of armed conß icts in the early 21st century, especially in various 
states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In such cases, PS agreements are 
called "a speciÞ c instrument of conß ict mediation# and "include the 
negotiating of a peace settlement between incumbents and rebels 
that provides for the partition of power within a government of 
national unity.#7 
Another type of PS in the broad sense is also the political elites% 
sharing of power with citizens. Such a phenomenon can be observed 
especially in the case of participatory or deliberative democracy. 
Both types of democracy allow non-politicians to participate!albeit 
in a somewhat different manner!in the political decision-making 
process. The Þ rst functions at the level of local self-government; 
the participatory budget is its most commonly used institution. The 
second, by promoting debate (including at the expert level) as a path 
to better quality political decisions with a higher degree of social 
legitimacy, can exist at various levels of power but continues to be 
mostly a theoretical concept.
5 F. Zanker, C. Simons, A. Mehler, "Power, Peace, and Space in Africa: Revisiting 
Territorial Power Sharing,# African Affairs, 2014, Vol. 114, Issue 454, pp. 72$91; A. Mehler, 
"Power Sharing,# in: Routledge Handbook of African Politics, N. Cheeseman, D. Anderson, 
A. Scheibler (eds.), Routledge, Oxford 2013, pp. 189$201; A. Mehler, "Peace and Power 
Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship,# African Affairs, 2009, Vol. 108, Issue 
432, pp. 453$473; D.M. Tull, A. Mehler, "The Hidden Costs of PS: Reproducing Insurgent 
Violence in Africa,# African Affairs, 2005, Vol. 104, No. 416, pp. 375$398.
6 F. Zanker, C. Simons, A. Mehler, Power, Peace, and Space in Africa&, p. 72.
7 D.M. Tull, A. Mehler, The Hidden Costs of PS&, p. 386.
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Various solutions in a state%s territorial organization, including 
decentralization and federalization, can be seen as a type of vertical 
PS. In such situations power is shared between different levels of 
government: local, state (provincial), and central/federal.
As can be seen in the examples cited, in the broad sense, the 
term "PS# can be very capacious. In this case, PS concerns the 
participation of more than one group or institutional entity in 
some form of state power and at some of its levels. PS in the broad 
sense seems to be accurately deÞ ned by B. O%Leary as "any set 
of arrangements that prevent one agent, or organized collective 
agency, from being the 'winner who holds all critical power,% whether 
temporarily or permanently.#8
And last but not least, PS does not necessarily refer to power 
sharing solely in states, but also at an international level,9 in unions 
of states (like the European Union,10 or between the EU and its 
member states11), in cities,12 or in political parties.13
PS IN THE NARROW SENSE 
In the political sciences, the term "PS# is used in the more 
speciÞ c, narrow sense of agreements made and institutionalized in 
multi-segmental states by political elites originating from various 
social segments, especially of a national, ethnic, religious, or 
denominational character. The conceptualization of the term "PS# 
in this case is well advanced, but that fact does not preclude the 
existence of differences of interpretation, or the distinguishing of 
various models as part of PS in the narrow sense.
8 B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places&#, p. 3.
9 M.W. Zacher, "The Conundrums of International Power Sharing: The Politics 
of Security Council Reform,# in: The United Nations and Global Security, R.M. Price, 
M.W. Zacher (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004, pp. 211$225.
10 J. van Zeben, "Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: A Competence 
Allocation Approach,# Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2014, Vol. 38, pp. 415$464; 
I. Manners, "The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European 
Union,# in: Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, S. Lucarelli, I. Manners 
(eds.), Routledge, London 2006, p. 34.
11 F.J. Campbell, "Power Sharing in the European Union: Has Court of Justice Activism 
Changed the Balance?,# North East Law Review, 2013, Vol. 1, pp. 109$139.
12 R. de Bercegol, Small Towns and Decentralisation in India: Urban Local Bodies in the 
Making, Springer, New Delhi 2017, p. 86.
13 W. Cross, "Understanding Power-Sharing within Political Parties: Stratarchy as 
Mutual Interdependence between the Party in the Centre and the Party on the Ground,# 
Government and Opposition, 2018, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 205$230.
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In the narrow sense, PS should be seen above all as a type of 
political system.14 The notion of "political system# includes the 
structures, organizations, consciousness, culture, relations, values, 
and norms characteristic of the political community in which the 
system appears. The basic elements of a political system, however, 
are its institutions, as represented by a set of rules. A set of speciÞ c 
institutions in turn forms a speciÞ c PS model. 
For several reasons, PS in the narrow sense should be deÞ ned 
as a political system. First, most of the characteristics of PS extend 
beyond notions such as "system of government# (e.g., parliamentary, 
presidential, semi-presidential); "form of government# (e.g., 
a republic, a monarchy); "political regime# (e.g., democracy, a hybrid 
regime, authoritarianism); or "territorial organization# (e.g., a unitary 
state, a federation). Second, having institutions that complement 
each other for the purpose of reaching a speciÞ c aim (peace, 
political stabilization) is characteristic of PS. Third, PS is based on 
systematized conceptual bases, that is, on a certain philosophy of 
thought and action. In this sense, philosophy should be understood 
as the general principles and ideas upon which the idea of PS rests. 
It may be assumed that the more such elements of a political system 
as consciousness, culture, values, and norms are imbued with 
a philosophy of thought and action typical for PS and the more the 
political system is based on inter-segmental cooperation, the more 
the deÞ nition of PS as a type of political system will be warranted. 
It should be obvious that PS as a political system is not 
something that exists from the moment when institutions!
!understood as the sets of rules typical of some PS models!
!are formed in the legal sense, but rather PS is something that is 
constantly evolving!not so much institutionally but primarily on the 
level of consciousness. Thus, PS may be more or less strongly rooted 
in the consciousness of the elites and other members of individual 
segments in multi-segmental  societies. Moreover, presumably the 
more segment members, especially the elites, understand the need 
for a PS system, the greater should be its durability. Consequently, 
it may be assumed that PS in Switzerland is more developed and, 
14 T.D. Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conß icts, Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conß icts, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC 
1996, p. 4; Reilly B., Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia, 
Murdoch University, Research Repository, 2011, p. 8, http://researchrepository.murdoch.
edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political_Reform_and_the_Demise_of_Consociationalism_in_
Southeast_Asia.pdf [access: April 6, 2018].
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at the same time, more enduring, than PS in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It should be noted that while PS as a system should not 
be understood solely as a set of certain institutions, other elements 
of the system are very difÞ cult to measure. In this context, it is only 
by convention that the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina could 
serve as an example of a nascent PS system.
However, PS can be considered a strategy aimed at conß ict 
management or resolution (with a set of accompanying political and 
legal arrangements) when the political system of a multi-segmental 
state is not yet marked by a philosophy of thought and action in the 
spirit of peace and inter-segmental power sharing, that is, when PS-
-type arrangements are being introduced mechanically as an attempt 
to end a conß ict or in a post-conß ict context (for example, as a result 
of an ad hoc peace agreement ending conß ict between two mutually 
hostile ethnic segments).15 However, even in such a situation, PS-
-type arrangements can form a signiÞ cant part of the political 
system. A consensual political culture should evolve, and there 
should be an awareness of the necessity for joint nurturing of the 
compromises attained. 
It should now be asked: What makes PS in the narrow sense 
a speciÞ c type of political system? To answer this question, the 
following basic elements that make PS into a distinct political system 
should be indicated:
$ PS usually emerges in a context of growing awareness on the 
part of segmental elites that in a multi-segmental state the tensions 
and conß icts between segments deÞ ned by certain ascribed or 
cultural criteria $ or conß icts between segments and the central 
government $ can not be limited without resorting to systemic PS 
arrangements. In particular, ongoing conß icts produce an awareness 
among the elites that relations between segments have to be based 
on mutual compromises and on norms and values going beyond 
particular interests; 
$ The core of PS consists in the inclusion of segmental elites 
in various structures and levels of power and, as a result, in the 
decision-making process. PS should be inclusive with regard to all 
representatives who enjoy broad legitimacy amongst their segments;
$ The basis of the decision-making process in PS is political 
collaboration between the elites of various segments, going beyond 
15 In practice it is often unusually difÞ cult to make a clear distinction between PS as 
a political system and PS as a strategy whose aim is conß ict management or resolution.
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the interests of individual segments and attempting to reconcile 
them. SpeciÞ c arrangements furthering this collaboration differ 
depending on the PS model;
$ PS may include political arrangements of a formal character, 
but also those of a non-formal nature, that is, arrangements not 
guaranteed by the constitution or by other statutory acts of law;
$ Although PS exists above all in the political dimension, the 
sharing of power and, therefore, of inß uence between segments 
can also be done in the sphere of the economy (economic PS),16 
the military (military PS),17 security institutions (PS in security 
agencies),18 the justice administration system (PS in the judiciary, 
judicial PS, PS in the courts),19 the media (PS in the media),20 and the 
civil service and administration (PS in the civil service, administrative 
PS).21 The political system is not an isolated entity but is directly 
16 K. Miti, E. Abatan, S. Minou, "Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa%s Conß icts?,# 
Southern African Peace and Security Studies, 2013, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2; A. Mehler, Peace and 
Power Sharing in Africa", p. 459; K. Trzci ski, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia",# 
p. 179; K. Trzci ski, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia%s Centripetalism&,# p. 16.
17 M. Cammett, E. Malesky, "Power Sharing in Postconß ict Societies: Implications 
for Peace and Governance,# Journal of Conß ict Resolution, 2012, Vol. 56, No. 6, p. 990; 
S. Vandeginste, "Power-Sharing in Burundi: An Enduring Miracle?,# in: Power-Sharing: 
Empirical and Normative Challenges, A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), Routledge, London 
2017, p. 169. 
18 A.M. Hersi, "Application of Power-sharing Models in Managing Intractable Clan 
Conß ict in Somalia,# International Journal of Political Science, 2015, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 
p. 21.
19 S. Graziadei, "Power Sharing Courts,# Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2016, 
Vol. 3, Issue 1, p. 66; A.M. Hersi, "Application of Power-sharing Models",# p. 15; S. Wolff, 
"A Resolvable Frozen Conß ict? Designing a Settlement for Transnistria,# European Centre 
for Minority Issues, ECMI Issue Brief, 2011, No. 26, p. 7; S. Wolff, "Guarantee Options for 
a Settlement of the Conß ict over Transnistria,# European Centre for Minority Issues, ECMI 
Working Paper, 2011, No. 51, p. 11.
20 T. Jusi , L.K. Palmer, "The Media and Power-Sharing: Towards an Analytical 
Framework for Understanding Media Policies in Post-Conß ict Societies: Public Broadcasting 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina,# Global Media Journal$Polish Edition, 2008, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
p. 119; S. Ba*i -Hrvatin, M. Thompson, "Public Service Broadcasting in Plural and 
Divided Societies,# in: Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States, 
S. Ba*i  Hrvatin, M. Thompson, T. Jusi  (eds.), Media Center, Sarajevo 2008, pp. 24$38; 
I.K. Davis, "International News and the Distribution Question: China, Falun Dafa and 
Pluralism in Canadian Media Policy,# The Political Economy of Communication, 2016, 
Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 86; L.K. Palmer, Power-Sharing in Media ! Integration of the Public?, 
Media Online, 2001, p. 1, http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/pdf.asp?ID=106+n=POWER-
SHARING<20IN<20MEDIA<20-<20INTEGRATION<20OF<20THE<20PUBLIC? [access: 
March 23, 2018].
21 K. Kupferberg, S. Wolff, "Sudan: 'Successful% Constitutional Reform Spurs Localized 
Violence,# in: Constitutions and Conß ict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil War Through 
Institutional Design, A.J. Kuperman (ed.), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 
2015, p. 102; G.B. Peters, E. Schröter, P. von Maravi , "Representative Bureaucracy: 
Concept, Driving Forces, Strategies,# in: Representative Bureaucracy in Action: Country 
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connected with each of the above-mentioned spheres. Moreover, they 
all overlap with the political system and have an impact on it. 
$ In multi-segmental societies conß icts in relations between 
segments or between them and the central government often occur. 
PS arrangements that are well designed and respected, ideally 
by all segments but particularly by the largest and most powerful 
ones, can be helpful in reconciling different segmental interests 
and, as a result, in limiting conß icts, especially those of an ethnic, 
religious, or communal nature.22 The principal advantage of using 
a PS system, especially one of its main models, or elements of it, 
is the building of peace and political stability in multi-segmental 
societies.23 However, the mere institution of a political system of 
the PS-type is no guarantee of peace and stability. In this context, 
it becomes important that those in power in multi-segmental 
societies achieve success in the resolution of social and economic 
problems and in building prosperity. In terms of PS effectiveness, 
the international neighborhood can play a signiÞ cant role by aiding 
and, above all, not hampering the implementation and working of 
arrangements forming the basis of PS (Lebanon is a case in point);
$ By allowing members of the political elites of various 
segments to take part in the decision-making process, PS helps 
diminish the concentration of power and the beneÞ ts derived 
from it by a segment that is dominant by virtue of its size and/or 
strength and consequently reduces the arbitrariness of power.24 PS 
can decrease both the power of the majority, obtained through free 
ProÞ les from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia, P. von Maravi , B.G. Peters, E. Schröter 
(eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2013, p. 17; Centre for Public Policy Studies (CPPS), 
Towards a More Representative and World Class Malaysian Civil Service, Kuala Lumpur, 
2006, p. 6, http://cpps.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Malaysian-Civil-Service-
9MP-Recommendations.pdf [access: April 3, 2018].
22 K. Trzci ski, "Co czy i dzieli 'communal conß ict% oraz 'konß ikt etniczny%? Analiza 
znaczeniowa obu terminów i ich nigeryjska egzempliÞ kacja ["What are the Similarities and 
Differences between Communal and Ethnic Conß icts? An Analysis of the Meaning of Both 
Notions and Their Nigerian ExempliÞ cation#], Afryka 2015, No. 42, pp. 11$30.
23 K. Trzci ski, "Czym jest stabilno  polityczna pa stwa?# ["What is the Political 
Stability of a State?], Przegl d Politologiczny 2015, No. 2, pp. 37$47.
24 Even institutions of so-called majoritarian democracy are frequently unable 
to ease inter-segmental relations in multi-segmental states. For more on this subject, see 
K. Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington IN 1996, pp. 172, 176$178; K. Wiredu, Society and Democracy in 
Africa, in: Explorations in African Political Thought: Identity, Community, Ethics, T. Kiros 
(ed.), Routledge, New York 2001, pp. 178$181; K. Wiredu, Tradition, Democracy and Political 
Legitimacy in Contemporary Africa, in: Rewriting Africa: Toward Renaissance or Collapse?, 
E. Kurimoto (ed.), The Japan Center for Area Studies, Osaka 2001, p. 163.
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elections in a democracy or in a hybrid regime,25 and authoritarian 
power (as was long the case in Nigeria, for example). In authoritarian 
conditions, the so-called collusion or cartel of elites can form the 
basis for PS-type arrangements. It can not be ruled out that PS 
helps with democratization (this may be the case in Nigeria today), 
or in attaining good governance (as may be the case in Northern 
Ireland, for example). It should be borne in mind, however, that in 
the case of certain multi-segmental states, PS may be the very basis 
for their functioning (again, Lebanon is a case in point). In such 
a situation, democratization, good governance, or various social and 
economic ills are of secondary importance, at least at the initial PS-
-arrangement stage. That does not mean they are of no signiÞ cance 
with regard to attaining a number of fundamental goals, like peace in 
inter-segmental relations and political stability in a multi-segmental 
state. 
Although the real functioning of PS (understood as a political 
system or conß ict management/resolution strategy) is frequently 
analyzed as involving a set of institutions, especially of a formal type, 
it should more often be treated as a philosophy of thought and action 
applied in real-life conditions and serving to reach lasting peace 
and political stability. If PS is seen primarily from this perspective, 
rather than as a set of institutions alone, then analysis of its deeper 
systemic traits, including such elements of the political system as 
consciousness, culture, relations, values, and norms, will be easier. 
In addition to being a political system or conß ict management/
resolution strategy, PS is also an empirical and normative theory. 
The empirical theory identiÞ es an existing political system or 
conß ict management/resolution strategy of a PS nature, with its 
speciÞ c political institutions, and analyzes them from various 
angles. Analyzing PS effectiveness in terms of its aims is particularly 
important in this regard. The normative theory proposes new or 
improved, presumably optimal, solutions, even though it rests in 
part on those already in place and on experience of their use. Not 
infrequently, it is a response to the shortcomings and drawbacks of 
the existing PS system.
In order to effectively distinguish the term "PS# in the narrow 
sense from its broad-sense counterpart in the literature, it is 
often associated with an adjective. Terms like the following are 
25 B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places&#, pp. 2$3.
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used when PS is used in connection with segments of an ethnic or 
similar character: "ethnic PS,#26 "interethnic PS,#27 "ethno-national 
PS,#28 "cross-national PS,#29 "cross-ethnic PS,#30 "inter-tribal 
PS,#31 "ethno-tribal PS,#32 "clan-based PS,#33 "cross-cultural PS,#34 
and "PS between linguistic groups.#35 When PS is connected with 
segments of a religious or similar nature, the terms "religious PS,#36 
26 S. Vandeginste, "Governing Ethnicity after Genocide: Ethnic Amnesia in Rwanda 
versus Ethnic Power-Sharing in Burundi,# Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2014, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 263; N.-C. Bormann, "The Causes and Consequences of Ethnic Power-
-Sharing,# National Centre of Competence in Research, NCCR Working Paper, 2014, 
No. 83, p. 1; P. Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: 
Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?, 2005, p. 9, https://wcÞ a.harvard.edu/Þ les/wcÞ a/
Þ les/864_powersharing_solutions.pdf [access: March 11, 2018].
27 D.L. Horowitz, "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems,# Journal of Democracy, 
2014, Vol. 25, Issue 2, p. 5; M. Brusis, "The European Union and Interethnic Power-Sharing 
Arrangements in Accession Countries,# Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe, 2015, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 60; B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places&#, 
p. 24. 
28 B. O%Duffy, "The Nation-State and Nationalism,# in: Comparative Politics: Explaining 
Democratic Systems, J. Bara, M. Pennington (eds.), SAGE, London 2009, p. 89; J. Thomson, 
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"sectarian PS,#37 "inter-sectarian PS,#38 and "cross-sectarian PS#39 
may appear.
In the literature the term "PS# is also found accompanied by an 
adjective and used in connection with PS in the narrow sense, such 
as in "ethno-religious PS,#40 and "ethno-sectarian PS,#41 which refer 
to situations in which "PS# used for ethnic or similar segments is 
combined with "PS# used for religious or similar communities. 
Other terms related to segmental divisions are also used in 
the literature, especially "ethno-regional PS,#42 "segmental PS,#43 
"inter-segmental PS,#44 and "corporate PS.#45 The last of these 
37 S. Rosiny, "Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon%s Experience,# German 
Institute of Global and Area Studies, GIGA Working Papers, 2013, No. 223, p. 17; 
I. Salamey, "Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options,# International 
Journal of Peace Studies, 2009, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 83; S. Makdisi, M. Marktanner, "Trapped 
By Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon,# Topics in Middle Eastern and North African 
Economies, 2009, Vol. 11, p. 1.
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Hybrid Political Order,# The Journal of Development Studies, 2016, Vol. 52, No. 2, p. 258.
39 R. Hinnebusch, "Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the 
Middle East: An Overview and Critique,# Democratization, 2006, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 389; 
M. Eisenstadt, The Rise of ISIL: Iraq and Beyond (Part II), The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2014, p. 3, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/
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stands in direct opposition to liberal PS, or more speciÞ cally, 
to liberal consociationalism, which assumes, among other things, 
the existence side by side of institutions nurturing group rights and 
supra-group institutions referring to individuals or to society as 
a whole, and not to ethnic or religious segments.46 
Liberal PS can be seen as a type of bridge between PS in the 
broad sense and PS in the narrow sense. Of a similar type is the 
PS already discussed in this article: the result of a peace agreement 
between the parties to a conß ict, if the parties to it are, in some 
part, ethnic or religious segments, and the main elements of the PS 
arrangement are institutions characteristic for one of the models 
of PS in the narrow sense. These examples indicate how difÞ cult it 
can be at times to make a clear distinction between PS in the broad 
sense and PS in the narrow sense.
CONSOCIATIONAL, CENTRIPETAL (INTEGRATIVE),
AND HYBRID POWER SHARING
Although the main aim of this article is not to discuss speciÞ c 
models of PS in the narrow sense, the most important of the models 
should be mentioned, at least brieß y, because PS in the narrow 
sense can also be understood in different ways. 
In particular, even though the literature usually considers PS 
in the consociational form to be simply one of the models of PS 
in the narrow sense (presumably the best known, studied, and 
conceptualized), in some of the literature PS is seen as synonymous 
with consociationalism. The authors who use the term in this 
manner seem not to recognize centripetalism (integrative PS), for 
example, as a PS model, because they see PS and consociationalism 
as being one and the same.
That centripetalism should also be recognized as a model of PS 
in the narrow sense can even be deduced: for instance, through 
analogy to the understanding of the term "PS# in the broad sense. 
In keeping with the latter, power in a state can be divided between 
various entities in various ways. For example, power within the 
46 A. McCulloch, "Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The Liberal-
-Corporate Distinction,# Democratization, 2014, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 501$518; Cf. B.F. 
Salloukh, R.A. Verheij, "Transforming Power Sharing: From Corporate to Hybrid Consociation 
in Postwar Lebanon,# Middle East Law and Interdisciplinary Governance Journal, 2017, 
Vol. 9, pp. 147$173.
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framework of the government of a given state can be divided between 
men and women belonging to the same political party. Similarly, 
individuals who are members of different ethnic groups or religious 
communities (among other entities) may belong to one of the key 
centripetal institutions!supra-regional and supra-ethnic parties!
!and thus participate in the exercise of power. As in the context 
of PS in the broad sense, various entities that share power are 
allowed to participate in the decision-making process. Thus!and 
this is characteristic of both consociationalism and centripetalism!
!PS in the narrow sense makes it possible for members of different 
segments deÞ ned primarily in ascriptive and cultural terms to share 
power. As PS models in the narrow sense, consociationalism and 
centripetalism were formulated for states with multi-segmental 
societies, especially deeply divided ones. Their method of PS is 
primarily to favor, albeit in different ways, members of segments 
distinguished by ascriptive and cultural criteria: nations and 
ethnic groups on the one hand, and religious and denominational 
communities on the other.47 
Moreover, PS occurs within the framework of a given model%s main 
institutions, which may be assisted by auxiliary institutions of a formal 
or informal nature, in keeping with the philosophy of the model. 
On the one hand, these elements are common to consociationalism 
and centripetalism (the two main PS models in the narrow sense) 
and, on the other, they distinguish them from PS between groups 
whose separateness is based on other criteria (such as gender), that 
is, in the spirit of PS in the broad sense.
And last but not least, if PS in the narrow sense were to be 
limited solely to consociationalism, there would be no need to make 
use of both names for the purpose of deÞ ning the same model of 
political system. 
Even though two main types of PS in the narrow sense!
!consociationalism and centripetalism!are usually distinguished 
in the literature, they are most often treated as opposites. 
The philosophy of consociationalism rests in large measure on 
the recognition of group rights. In the context of PS in the narrow 
sense, such groups, or segments, are primarily nations, ethnic 
47 But PS in the narrow sense may also allow segments created on other bases to take 
part in the exercise of power, as, for example, in liberal consociationalism. See A. McCulloch, 
Consociational Settlements&, pp. 501$518.
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groups, and religious and denominational communities forming part 
of  multi-segmental societies and not infrequently inhabiting a given 
territory in compact settlements. In the spirit of consociationalism, 
ethnic/national48 or religious/denominational segments should be 
entitled to certain particular rights by virtue of their possession and 
articulation of group interests. According to Stuart J. Kaufman,49 
the most important group interests, distinguished on an ascriptive 
or cultural basis, include linguistic, religious, and economic 
interests. The task of consociational institutions is to protect and 
reinforce group interests. The protection of those interests implies 
the maintenance of a status quo, such as economic beneÞ ts, for 
example. Reinforcing group interests means making them more 
durable.
The philosophy of consociationalism entails the belief that one%s 
interests are never better served than by oneself. The essence of 
consociationalism can thus be said to be the assumption that, in 
a multi-segmental society, especially one that is deeply divided, 
individual segments, as interest groups of sorts, should have their 
own representation in the state power structure and a role in 
political decision-making. In consequence, group interests are best 
served by consociational!ideally, formally entrenched!institutions, 
such as ethnic, communal, or segmental parties forming grand 
coalitions; segmental autonomy; proportionality in elections; division 
of positions in the government, public agencies, or army; and 
a minority veto right. It is best if the decision-making process rests 
on a consensual approach to issues by segmental representatives, 
even though attaining such a consensus is often difÞ cult and 
time consuming. Although consociational institutions protect the 
interests of individual segments, they may also increase awareness 
of the beneÞ ts, in a consociational political system, of belonging 
to a segment and consequently may reinforce segmental identities 
and politicize ethnicity.
The philosophy of centripetalism has a more limited 
relationship with group rights. As a type of PS, centripetalism, 
like consociationalism, is intended to assure members of various 
segments of a share in power!not as part of particular institutions 
protecting and reinforcing the interests of individual segments, but 
48 Including linguistic segments.
49 S.J. Kaufman, "Ethnicity as a Generator of Conß ict,# in: Routledge Handbook of 
Ethnic Conß ict, K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge, London 2011, pp. 91, 94$95.
24 Krzysztof Trzci ski
in the dimension of supra-segmental, or inter-segmental institutions, 
that is, institutions that are open to individuals from all segments. 
Such an approach is primarily aimed at nurturing integrative 
political behavior among members of the political elites across 
segmental divisions in a manner that transcends group interests 
and that depoliticizes, overcomes, and reduces the signiÞ cance of 
segmental differences.50 
Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, does not 
promote institutional recognition of segmental differences and 
interests. Quite the contrary, the essence of centripetalism is 
to foster cooperation not so much between segments as between 
members of different segments, and even sui generis to force them 
to cooperate by creating an integrative institutional framework. 
The principal formal centripetal institutions include supra-regional 
and inter-segmental parties and, should the need arise, coalitions 
between them; decentralization leading to a division of large 
segments into smaller parts that inhabit different!ideally multi-
segmental!states or provinces, thus inclining regional political 
elites of different segments to collaborate with one another; the 
election of a supra-segmental president (supported by members of 
various segments) through the use of the so-called territorial vote-
distribution requirement, that is, the need to win an appropriately 
large number of votes in presidential elections in the majority of 
states or provinces (meeting this requirement is indispensible for 
occupying the presidential ofÞ ce, and merely winning a numerical 
majority of votes is insufÞ cient);51 and preferential voting in 
parliamentary elections (especially to the lower chamber) in the form 
of either a single transferable vote or an alternative vote, through the 
ranking of candidates, which makes it possible for voters to indicate 
preferences among candidates of different parties.52 
50 B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-PaciÞ c, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2007, especially pp. 83$91; B. Reilly, "Centripetalism,# in: 
K. Cordell and S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conß ict&, especially 
pp. 291$295; B. Reilly, "Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation and Integration,# 
in: S. Wolff, C. Yakinthou (eds.), Conß ict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and 
Practice, Routledge, New York 2011, pp. 57$65.
51 K. Trzci ski, "Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement&#, pp. 89$107.
52 In the case of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce the chances 
of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and 
actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting systems 
functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji, and in Papua New Guinea, among other places. 
See B. Reilly, Democracy and Diversity", pp. 115$118; A. McCulloch, "Does Moderation 
Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies,# Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review 
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To summarize, centripetalism shapes conditions for integration, 
that is, it reduces differences between members of various segments 
and, by so doing, creates a more cohesive whole from many parts. 
Consociationalism is more akin to a policy of accommodation:53 
the political recognition of differences and the mutual adaptation 
of segments to one another. PS accommodation arrangements are 
those that meet the segments% aspirations to have their own distinct 
institutions and that create conditions enabling the protection of the 
segments% interests.54
Centripetalism, like consociationalism, also has disadvantages. 
Just as consociationalism can reinforce group identities, 
centripetalism can mainly protect the interests of the principal 
segment,55 or segments,56 in the state. 
It is perhaps in part for this reason that institutions proper 
to both main PS models are not infrequently combined in one 
political system. At Þ rst glance, consociationalism and centripetalism 
are difÞ cult to reconcile. This does not mean, however, that 
institutions according to one or the other model can not coexist in 
one state. Just as right-wing and left-wing political parties can share 
power in a state by forming a governing coalition (in PS in the broad 
sense), so consociational and centripetal institutions can function 
side by side in the same multi-segmental society in PS in the narrow 
sense. Together, they form a third PS model in the narrow sense, 
which I propose to call "hybrid power sharing# (HPS). It is a model 
enabling both integration and accommodation. 
In short, HPS is a real type of inter-segmental PS system, which 
includes elements that can be referred to as heterogenic, as they 
originate with PS models that have different conceptual bases. But 
as can be seen in practice, the elements of one of the PS models, 
centripetalism or consociationalism, are always dominant in a HPS 
of Ethnopolitics, 2013, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 111$132; A. McCulloch, "The Track Record of 
Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places,# in: J. McEvoy, B. O%Leary (eds.), Power-Sharing&, 
pp. 94$111.
53 B. O%Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places&#, p. 19.
54 Alan J. Kuperman, "Designing Constitutions to Reduce Domestic Conß ict,# in: 
A.J. Kuperman (ed.), Constitutions and Conß ict Management in Africa&, p. 6.
55 In Indonesia, for example, there is one main ethnic group!the Javanese, and one 
common religious community!Muslims, the majority of whom are Sunnis.
56 In Nigeria, for example, there are three main ethnic groups!the Hausa-Fulani, 
the Yoruba, and the Igbo, and two main religious communities!Muslims and Christians 
(mainly Protestants).
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system. HPS can be found in Indonesia57 and Nigeria,58 for example. 
Centripetal elements are dominant in the political systems of both 
countries, but they are enhanced by consociational institutions. 
The political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia are the best 
examples of HPS. Most PS institutions in Nigeria and Indonesia are 
characteristic of centripetalism. These institutions are a centripetal 
territorial structure made up of multi-segmental states or provinces; 
the election of a supra-segmental president through the use of 
a territorial vote distribution requirement; and supra-regional and 
inter-ethnic political parties. 
In Nigeria, centripetal institutions are complemented with 
consociational solutions, which are understood either as a type of 
grand coalition in Lijphart%s understanding of the term (so-called 
"universal participation,# or a "cartel of elites#),59 or as an emanation 
of the principle of proportionality, especially in the political 
representation, or a type of economic PS. These solutions are, 
above all: 1) the formal requirement, de facto of a parity type, for 
the cabinet to have a multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition; 
2) the informal principle of rotating the presidency between Muslims 
and Christians; 3) the informal principle in keeping with which 
the vice-presidency is given to a member of a different religious 
community and ethnic group than that from which the president 
originates; 4) the federal government%s return of part of the revenues 
derived from the exploitation of energy resources to a number of 
states in the south of Nigeria (the Niger Delta).60
In Indonesia, in addition to the main centripetal institutions, 
the following consociational institutions are in place: 1) special 
autonomy for the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua (one 
of the most important elements of such autonomy is the application 
57 K. Trzci ski, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia&,# pp. 168$185; K. Trzci ski, 
"The Consociational Addition to Indonesia%s Centripetalism&,# pp. 5$20.
58 K. Trzci ski, "How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power Sharing Can 
Complement Each Other&,# pp. 53$73.
59 A. Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory 
and Practice, Routledge, London 2008, p. 29. See also R. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy 
in Germany, Doubleday, Garden City, NY 1967, p. 276.
60 R.T. Suberu, "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conß ict: The Nigerian 
Experience,# in: Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, 
D. Turton (ed.), James Currey, Oxford 2006, pp. 75$76; S.A. Rustad, "Power-Sharing and 
Conß ict in Nigeria: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes,# Center 
for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, CSCW Papers, Oslo 
2008, pp. 19$22.
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in Aceh of sharia law, which is not in force in other parts of 
Indonesia);61 2) economic PS arrangements, in keeping with which 
the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua retain the lion%s share 
of revenues generated by the exploitation of those provinces% natural 
resources; 3) segmental parties!religious ones within the territory 
of the entire state, and ethnic ones in the province of Aceh. These 
institutions are emanations of consociational autonomy for segments 
and recognition for group rights.
The reason for the emergence and continued existence of HPS 
(that is, a mix of various elements from different PS models in one 
multi-segmental state) is rather simple: It%s a combination of need 
and interest. The elites of a given segment may feel either a strong 
desire for guaranteed rights to something (to have ethnic-based 
parties, for example) or that they lack such guarantees. Obtaining 
the right to something is seen as favorable for the segment in 
question (for example, it is assumed that ethnic parties will 
better meet the needs of the segment than inter-ethnic parties). 
In each case, however, the need for HPS may be different!it may 
be articulated by the elites of one or more segments and refer 
to different PS dimensions. The implementation of HPS follows 
negotiations and is the result of a satisfactory arrangement for 
both sides. For example, the introduction of certain consociational 
elements to a political system dominated by centripetal institutions 
enhances centripetalism in those areas where it proves inadequate 
to produce a stabilizing effect. For example, the beneÞ ts from the 
use of consociational institutions in conditions where centripetal 
institutions are dominant can also be derived by the central 
authorities, because providing a given segment the PS institutions it 
needs can put an end to a long-lasting and costly conß ict, as was the 
case in the Indonesian province of Aceh, among other places. The 
combination of centripetal and consociational elements should thus 
produce a stabilizing effect where centripetalism or consociationalism 
alone are insufÞ cient.
61 In the case of the provinces of Papua and West Papua, special autonomy has been 
introduced only in part. See K. Trzci ski, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia%s 
Centripetalism",# pp. 5$20.
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CONCLUSIONS
Terminology is unusually important in scholarship, as it 
facilitates discussion. Debate between political scientists, however, 
is at times made more difÞ cult because certain terms have not been 
precisely deÞ ned. During conferences it happens that scholars 
exchange views using terms which they understand in disparate 
ways: for example, they broaden or narrow a term%s most frequently 
encountered meaning. A similar situation often occurs in collective 
works devoted to a speciÞ c issue, when the various authors make 
use of the same term but understand it differently. Of course, terms 
at times have many meanings, but very frequently they are simply 
understood differently. Just as often a related problem can be 
seen, namely, calling the same phenomenon or process by diverse 
terms. The lack of terms to adequately deÞ ne certain new or recently 
noticed phenomena or processes is a separate issue. In consequence, 
one of the major problems in contemporary political science involves, 
on the one hand, the lack of terminological clarity, that is, the lack 
of a universal terminological grid, and on the other, a terminological 
deÞ ciency. An absence of terminological order also characterizes the 
question of PS.
In this article, I sought to make a clear distinction between 
the broad and narrow meanings of the term "PS.# In one sense, 
the term is very broad and can be used in connection with the 
participation of various groups or institutional entities in some 
form of power. In the horizontal dimension it can encompass power 
sharing by, for example, various political parties; political parties 
with institutionalized non-party entities, such as various social 
organizations and movements; between the sexes; between the 
parties to a conß ict, such as rebel organizations and the government; 
and also between the political elite and citizens. In the vertical 
dimension the term can be used in connection with power sharing 
between the central/federal government and regional governments 
or local government institutions.
PS in the narrow sense has been better theoretized and refers 
to the sharing of state power in multi-segmental societies (especially 
deeply divided ones) by segments deÞ ned in keeping with cultural 
and ascriptive criteria, especially nations (in the sociological 
sense), ethnic groups, religious communities, and denominational 
communities. PS in the narrow sense is also reß ected in mainly 
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formal institutions. The latter allow members of various segments 
to participate in the exercise of power, facilitate understanding 
between them, and, in consequence, contribute to reaching and 
maintaining peace and political stability in multi-segmental 
states. Most theoreticians seem to be in agreement about the 
main institutions that are typical for PS in the narrow sense. The 
attribution of given institutions to either the consociational or 
centripetal model (type) depends on which of these they correspond 
to conceptually. The term "PS# in the narrow sense encompasses 
two main elements: 1) power sharing in multi-segmental societies, 
in which segments are deÞ ned using cultural and ascriptive criteria; 
and 2) the functioning of a speciÞ c set of institutions furthering 
the maintenance of peaceful relations between these segments $ or 
between them and the central government $ and stabilizing the 
political situation in the state.  
It can be assumed that the less a given political system has 
traits of PS in the narrow sense (only some institutions are typical 
of a speciÞ c PS model) the more it is justiÞ able to speak only of the 
presence of certain PS elements and not of PS as a political system. 
According to the literature on the subject,62 consociationalism as 
an (almost) full model, or with only certain consociational elements, 
exists or existed in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, 
Fiji, the Netherlands, India, Northern Ireland, Columbia, Lebanon 
(confessional model), Macedonia, Malaysia, Republic of South 
Africa, Ruanda, South Tyrol, Switzerland, and Cyprus, among 
other countries or regions. Centripetalism is, or was, associated 
in particular with Nigeria, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Papua New 
Guinea. HPS functions in some of the countries mentioned, 
especially in Nigeria. In addition, consociational and centripetal 
elements are or were present side by side in Burundi, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, and Fiji, among other countries.
Although the main consociational and centripetal institutions 
have been identiÞ ed in the literature, full consociationalism is 
62 See, for example, J. McGarry, B. O%Leary, "Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational 
and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of Northern Ireland,# in: Power-Sharing&, 
A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), p. 66; B. O%Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: 
Normative and Explanatory Arguments,# in: From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conß ict 
Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, S. Noel (ed.), McGill-Queen%s University Press, 
Montreal 2005, p. 3; P. Norris, Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies&, 
p. 6; S. Wolff, K. Cordell, "Power Sharing,# in: Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conß ict&, 
K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), p. 300; A. McCulloch, "Does Moderation Pay?&#, p. 112.
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encountered only rarely in practice and centripetalism in the pure 
sense does not exist at all. Full theoretical models, that is, those that 
include all the institutions attributed to them, are usually abstract, 
or ideal propositions, even if they are in large measure empirically 
based. In the real-life conditions of multi-segmental societies, 
the institutions characteristic of any of the theoretical PS models 
are rarely all present, or only certain of their variants have been 
introduced, and these often depart from pure theoretical premises. 
In contrast, the HPS model is solidly rooted in practice, and 
combines chosen consociational and centripetal institutions, without 
any a priori assumptions about which consociational and centripetal 
institutions are included and in what proportion. Naturally, 
institutions of one PS model are always dominant in a HPS system: 
for example, centripetal institutions in Nigeria and HPS is not 
conceptually dogmatic, as are the theoretized consociational and 
centripetal models. HPS is an elemental model, open to various 
arrangements and the needs of the moment. SigniÞ cantly, HPS is 
effective in that it produces peace and political stability, as opposed 
to concordance with some pure theoretical requirements, which 
are few in its case. The existence of HPS indicates that an ultimate 
deÞ nition of PS in the narrow sense remains elusive.
